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TORTS - INJURIES FOLLOWING MENTAL DISTURBANCE - COLLECTION
LETTERS - To collect a lawful debt of $61.80, defendant collecting agent
wrote plaintiff three letters threatening to sue and to report plaintiff's poor pay
record to the members of defendant association if payment was not promptly
made. Plaintiff alleged that he was just recovering from a serious illness and that
the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's weakened condition; that the defendant sent the letters intending to cause the plaintiff mental and physical
injury, for the purpose of collecting the bill, and that the plaintiff did suffer
a relapse as well as mental agony. The trial court sustained the defendant's
demurrer. Held, reversed with direction to enter an order overruling the demurrer on the ground that there is liability when a person acts, without special
privilege, intending that harm should result, and the harm does result. Associate
Justice Vinson dissented. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men-of Washington,
D. C., (App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 62.
Although until recently 1 a majority of the American courts did not allow
recovery for physical injuries from fright or shock negligently caused in the
absence of physical impact,2 they did permit recovery when the defendant>s
conduct constituted a wilful tort.8 The plaintiff undoubtedly states a good

1 Since 1900 the great majority of courts which have passed up._n this question
have allowed recovery in the absence of "physical impact." "Act, Recommendation
and Study Relating to Liability for Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock," z N. Y.
LAw REVISION CoMMISSioN, ANNUAL REPORT 375 at 406 (1936) (N. Y. Leg. Doc.
No. 65E) {excellent treatment of this subject); z ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 436
(1934); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (189z).
2 Before l 900 most of the American courts followed the leading English case.
Victorian Railways Commrs. v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. zz2 (1888); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896); Nelson v. Crawford, xzz
Mich. 466, 81 N. W. 335 (1899). See 38 MicH. L. REV. z67 (1939).
8 Warmelink v. Tissue, 257 Mich. 228, z41 N. W. z.03 (193z); Lambert
v. Brewster, 97. W. Va. xz4, 125 S. E. 244 (1924) (wilful act towards a third person
in the presence of plaintiff); Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] z Q. B. 57.
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cause of action if the defendant has committed a wilful tort by exceeding his
legal rights in the means used to collect the debt.4 Because collection methods
vary so greatly, it is difficult to formulate any general rule in this class of cases, 5
but it seems to be agreed that, if the collecting agent's conduct imputes dishonesty,8 or tends to subject the plaintiff to disgrace and ridicule,7 or to invade
his "right of privacy," 8 the debtor can recover. In two recent cases,9 factually
quite similar to the instant case, the plaintiff debtor was allowed to recover for
mental injuries alone, resulting from the receipt of vindictive collection letters.
In both of these cases, the creditor's conduct seems to have been of a more
heinous nature than in the principal case. The three letters sent here contain
no charge of dishonesty or of moral turpitude and are not vindictive in tone, the
only threat being that the plaintiff's failure to pay might jeopardize his credit
4 The plaintiff's allegation that the defendant's conduct was "without any right
or color of right and without justification" seems to be a legal conclusion and not
admitted by the demurrer. As the dissent points out, whetlter or not the defendant's
conduct was justified is the real issue in the case.
5 55 A. L. R. 971 (1928); supplemented in 106 A. L. R. 1453 (1937). For
other collections of these cases, see: 91 A. L. R. 1495 (1934); 66 U. S. L. REV. 349
(1932).
6 Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932). See
note 9, infra.
7 Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46 N. W. 123 (1890) ("For collecting bad
debts" was written on the envelopes; held to be grossly libelous).
8 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927) {creditor placed
debtor's name on a large sign located in a public place and indicating that the latter
did not pay his bills; held to be an invasion of debtor's "right of privacy"). In connection with this doctrine, see: Pound, "Interests of Personality," 28 HARV. L. REv.
343 at 362 (1915).
9 In Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932),
defendant collecting agency wrote plaintiff, threatening to appeal to her employer and
"bother him until he is so disgusted he will throw you out the back door" and to
"tie you up tighter than a drum." Although no physical injuries were proved, recovery
was allowed for mental disturbance deliberately caused. This case is noted: 46 HARV.
L. REV. 164 (1932); 18 lowA L. REV. 397 (1933); 39 W. VA. L. Q. 186 (1933).
In La Salle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N. W. 424 (1934),
a suit on a promissory note, defendant counterclaimed for mental pain suffered as the
result of the plaintiff's coarse and vindictive letters sent to coerce payment of this note,
which was not legally collectible. Recovery was allowed on defendant's counterclaim.
Noted in 2 UN1v. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1934); 13 TEX. L. REV. 245 (1935); 13
NEB. L. BuL. 330 (1935).
Contra: Maze v. Employees' Loan Society, 217 Ala. 44, II4 So. 574 (1927),
where defendant "in a gross, rude and insulting manner" demanded from the plaintiff
usurious interest payments, recovery was not allowed for mental distress, but the court
pointed out that the result might have been different had physical injuries actually
been suffered. In Oehler v. L. Bamberger & Co., 4 N. J. Misc. 1003, 135 A. 71
(1926), affirmed 103 N. J. L. 703, 137 A. 425 (1927), defendant's salesman left with
the plaintiff housewife at her home a vacuum cleaner which she refused to buy. Later
he returned threatening arrest unless payment was made. Defendant's conduct resulted
in plaintiff's suffering a stroke of apoplexy. Decision denying plaintiff recovery was
upheld by an equally divided higher court.
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standing.10 It is questionable whether defendant's conduct should become actionable because of his intent to injure the plaintiff in the process of making collection.11 Since there is no tort liability for suing on a debt with a wrongful motive,12
it would seem, a fortiori, that there should be no liability for a mere demand of
payment. Furthermore, the principal case stands on even more questionable
ground, for here the defendant's ultimate purpose or motive, namely, to collect
a just debt, is a rightful one, and only his incidental intent of injuring the
plaintiff in the process is wrongful. 18 It must also be kept in mind that the
defendant's right arises because of the plaintiff's failure to perform the duty of
paying his debt.u Although the case is perhaps a hard one, because of the alleged
actual physical injury suffered by the plaintiff, the reasoning of the dissenting
judge seems the more convincing.

10 The strongest language in the three letters would seem to be:- "Do you realize
how your continued neglect of this account is going to affect your credit standing?
Wherever you go, whatever you do, a bad credit record will follow you like a shadow..••
Your future credit standing depends on your prompt payment of this account." 105 F.
(2d) 62 at 63.
•
11. Ames, "How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the
Actor," 18 HARV, L. R:Ev. 410 (1905). The following language is found: A creditor
may pursue "his debtor with all the rigor of the law in order to ruin him, although he
knows that with some indulgence he would realize more himself and enable his debtor
to avoid bankruptcy••••" Ibid. at 413. 3 CooLEY, ToRTS, 4th ed., §§ 534-537
(1932). The general rule is stated at p. 545: "Where one exercises a legal right only,
the motive which actuates him is immaterial." Quoted from Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68
Vt. 219 at 222, 35 A. 53 {1896). In South Royalton Bank v. Suff.ollr Bank, 27 Vt.
505 {1855), defendant bank, for the admitted purpose of draining the vaults and
injuring the plaintiff bank, collected notes issued by the plaintiff and demanded payment in specie. The court sustained defendant's demurrer, on the ground that defendant
acted within its legal rights and the motive was unimportant.
12 Buck v. Latham, I IO Minn. 523, 126 N. W. 278 (1910) where, in an action
by indorsee of a negotiable note, the defendant counterclaimed for damages on the
ground that the plaintiff had purchased the note rolely for the purpose of "harassing and
oppressing'' the defendant. Held, that the plaintiff had a legal right to collect the note
and no cause of action stated in the counterclaim.
18 Ames, "How Far an Act May be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the
Actor," 18 HARV. L. REv. 4II at 412 (1905).
u Ibid., at 4 I 2.

